In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: enetc: Fix illegal access when reading affinity_hint irq_set_affinity_hit() stores a reference to the cpumask_t parameter in the irq descriptor, and that reference can be accessed later from irq_affinity_hint_proc_show(). Since the cpu_mask parameter passed to irq_set_affinity_hit() has only temporary storage (it's on the stack memory), later accesses to it are illegal. Thus reads from the corresponding procfs affinity_hint file can result in paging request oops. The issue is fixed by the get_cpu_mask() helper, which provides a permanent storage for the cpumask_t parameter.
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