On Xtensa targets with CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_XTENSA_MMU, the page-table code (arch/xtensa/core/ptables.c) maintains a global list, xtensa_domain_list, of active memory domains using a list node embedded inside the caller-owned struct k_mem_domain. When a domain is destroyed via k_mem_domain_deinit() - arch_mem_domain_deinit(), the page tables are torn down and domain-arch.ptables is set to NULL, but the domain's node was not removed from xtensa_domain_list. The freed/deinitialized domain therefore remained linked into the global list as a dangling pointer into caller-owned storage that may then be freed or reused. Any subsequent arch_mem_map()/arch_mem_unmap() operation (widely invoked by kernel memory-mapping and demand-paging code) traverses the stale node and dereferences domain-p
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