In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/omfs: reject s_sys_blocksize smaller than OMFS_DIR_START omfs_fill_super() rejects oversized s_sys_blocksize values (> PAGE_SIZE), but it does not reject values smaller than OMFS_DIR_START (0x1b8 = 440). Later, omfs_make_empty() uses sbi->s_sys_blocksize - OMFS_DIR_START as the length argument to memset(). Since s_sys_blocksize is u32, a crafted filesystem image with s_sys_blocksize < OMFS_DIR_START causes an unsigned underflow there, wrapping to a value near 2^32. That drives a ~4 GiB memset() from bh->b_data + OMFS_DIR_START and overwrites kernel memory far beyond the backing block buffer. Add the corresponding lower-bound check alongside the existing upper-bound check in omfs_fill_super(), so that malformed images are rejected during superblock validation before any filesystem data is processed.
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